Attorney General of Florida — Opinion
October 16, 1997
RE: MUNICIPALITIES — FINES — LAW ENFORCEMENT — use of civil penalty for law enforcement automation. s. 318.21(10), Fla. Stat.
Civil penalty used for law enforcement automation
Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General
Chief William C. Watford Cottondale Police Department Post Office Box 398 Cottondale, Florida 32431
Dear Chief Watford:
You ask substantially the following question:
May the civil penalty imposed for traffic violations that is disbursed to the city pursuant to section 318.21, Florida Statutes, to fund local law enforcement automation be used to purchase law enforcement automobiles?
In sum:
The civil penalty imposed for traffic violations that is disbursed to the city pursuant to section 318.21, Florida Statutes, to fund local law enforcement automation may not be used to purchase law enforcement automobiles.
Section 318.21, Florida Statutes (1996 Supplement), provides a scheme for the distribution of civil penalties by county courts. The act states that “[a]ll civil penalties received by a county court pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be distributed and paid monthly [pursuant to the formula established by the act].”[1] Subsection (10) of the statute states:
“Twelve dollars and fifty cents from each moving traffic violation must be used by the county to fund that county’s participation in an intergovernmental radio communication program approved by the Division of Communications of the Department of Management Services. If the county is not participating in such a program, funds collected must be used to fund local law enforcement automation and must be distributed to the municipality or special improvement district in which the violation occurred or to the county if the violation occurred within the unincorporated area of the county.”
Prior to 1996, section 316.655(7), Florida Statutes (1995), provided:
“In addition to any other penalty provided for violation of the state uniform traffic control law pursuant to [chapter 316] or chapter 318, any county that [articipates in an intergovernmental radio communication program approved by the Division of Communications of the Department of Management Services may assess an additional surcharge of up to $12.50 for each moving traffic violation, which surcharge must be used by the county to fund that county’s participation in the program.”
This office, in Attorney General Opinion 94-38, stated that under the then-existing language of section 316.655, the use of the surcharge to fund a municipality’s, rather than a county’s, participation in an intergovernmental communication program was not authorized. The language of section 316.655 quoted above was deleted in 1996 by the same act that added language to section 318.21, Florida Statutes (1996 Supplement), authorizing a municipality to use the surcharge for law enforcement automation.[2]
Where the Legislature has not defined words, the language should usually be given its plain and ordinary meaning; consideration, however, must be given not only to the literal and usual meaning of words but also to their effect and meaning on the objectives and purposes of the statute’s enactment.[3] The term “automation” has been generally defined as “the technique of making an apparatus (as a calculating machine), a process (as of manufacturing), or a system (as of bookkeeping) operate automatically: the state of being operated automatically: automatically controlled operation of an apparatus, process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices that takes the place of human organs of observation, effort, and decision.”[4]
The use of the term “automation” elsewhere in the Florida Statutes is generally in accordance with the above definition.[5]
An examination of the legislative history surrounding the 1996 legislation indicates that the Legislature sought to reinstate the provisions formerly contained in section 316.655.[6] While section 318.21(10) is broader in that it authorizes the fees to be used by municipalities and special districts, nothing in the legislative history indicates an intent to authorize a law enforcement agency to expend such funds on automobiles.
In light of the above, I am of the opinion that the civil penalty imposed for traffic violations that is disbursed to the city pursuant to section 318.21, Florida Statutes, to fund local law enforcement automation may not be used to purchase law enforcement automobiles.
Sincerely,
Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General
RAB/tgk